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Abstract
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are a novel approach to generative mod-
elling, a task whose goal it is to learn a distribution of real data points. They have
often proved difficult to train: GANs are unlike many techniques in machine learn-
ing, in that they are best described as a two-player game between a discriminator
and generator. This has yielded both unreliability in the training process, and a
general lack of understanding as to how GANs converge, and if so, to what. The
purpose of this dissertation is to provide an account of the theory of GANs suit-
able for the mathematician, highlighting both positive and negative results. This
involves identifying the problems when training GANs, and how topological and
game-theoretic perspectives of GANs have contributed to our understanding and
improved our techniques in recent years.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) were proposed by Goodfellow et al. (2014)
as a novel approach to generative modelling, a task whose goal it is to learn a
distribution of real data points.
The term adversarial refers to the use of two opposing neural networks in GANs:
a discriminator trained to tell real data samples apart from GAN-produced samples,
and a generator that seeks to fool the discriminator. As can be seen in Figure 1.1,
GANs are capable of producing stunningly realistic samples.
However, they have also proved difficult to train: GANs are unlike many tech-
niques in machine learning, in that they are best described as a two-player game
between a discriminator and generator. This has yielded both unreliability in the
training process, and a general lack of understanding as to how GANs converge, and
if so, to what.
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an account of the theory of GANs
suitable for the mathematician, highlighting both positive and negative results.
Chapter 2 introduces GANs in their original formulation, in addition to some of the
main problems encountered during the training process. The results of this chapter
are largely due to Goodfellow et al. (2014), though I provide for the first time an
explicit proof1 of Proposition 2.6.1, and give a novel example (Corollary 2.6.2) of
its negative consequences for the training of GANs. Chapter 3 gives a perspective
of GANs as minimising some divergence between the generator distribution and the
target distribution, arguing that certain variants of GANs may induce a more practi-
cally useful notion of divergence than that induced by the original GAN formulation.
The results of this chapter are predominately due to Arjovsky et al. (2017). Chapter
4 discusses GANs from the perspective of game theory, which allows for a broader
modelling of GAN training dynamics than that of the previous chapter. The change
in emphasis is inspired by Fedus et al. (2017), with the main result for GANs coming
from Arora et al. (2017). Chapter 5 concludes this work.
1.1 Notation
• µ⊗ ν - the product measure, for measures µ and ν.
• B(X ) - the space of Borel-measurable subsets of X .
1The result has been claimed, though not proven, by a number of authors (Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Goodfellow, 2016; Metz et al., 2016; Arjovsky et al., 2017).
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Figure 1.1: 1024× 1024 images generated on the CelebA-HQ dataset. Image taken
from Karras et al. (2017, Figure 5).
• Prob(X ) - the space of probability measures on X .
• Cb(X ) - the space of bounded, continuous functions from X to R.
• [N ] - the set of integers {1, ..., N}, where N ∈ N.
• N (µ, σ2) - the Gaussian distribution on Rn with mean µ and variance σ2.
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Chapter 2
GANs: Initial Results
2.1 Motivation
The goal of generative modelling is to learn a particular distribution pr of real data.
The distribution pr may be represented explicitly
1, or implicitly by providing a
means to produce samples from the distribution.
The latter approach is taken by generative adversarial networks (GANs).
We may view a GAN as a game between two players: a generator and a discrim-
inator. The former is represented by a function G inducing a distribution pG (see
below), and the latter by a function D.
Consider a GAN trained on images of people. Given a fixed generator, the dis-
criminator is trained to distinguish between images produced by the real dataset
(labelled 1) and images produced by the generator (labelled 0). It does so by map-
ping each data point x to a value in [0, 1]. In some sense, D(x) represents the
probability that x was a real sample rather than a generated one.
The goal of the generator, consequently is to produce images that the discrim-
inator will classify as being real, while the goal of the discriminator is to classify
these same images as in fact being produced by the generator. The generator in-
duces a distribution pG by taking a sample z from a (typically Gaussian) prior on
input noise variables, pz, and mapping it to a synthetic data point G(z). Therefore,
if z ∼ pz, then pG is the distribution such that G(z) ∼ pG.
The generator aims to produce points such that D(G(z)) is closer to 1. In other
words, the generator is trying to fool the discriminator. As we shall see, it will
succeed at doing so when the images it produces arise from the same probability
distribution as that of the real images of people.
2.2 Minimax-GANs
To formally specify a GAN, we need to give to the generator and the discriminator
an objective that each seeks to optimise. Though we may give the discriminator
and generator distinct objectives, it is common and often useful for there to be one
objective that the generator seeks to minimise, and that the discriminator seeks
to maximise. In this case, which I shall refer to as the minimax2 case, we can
1For a taxonomy of such methods, see Goodfellow (2016, Sections 2.2-2.4).
2This minimax perspective will be elaborated in the context of game theory in Chapter 4.
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represent the objective by a single value function V (D,G).
Definition 2.2.1 (Idealised MM-GANs (Goodfellow et al., 2014)). Let Z ⊆ R`,
X ⊆ Rd be ambient data spaces, let pz be a prior distribution over Z, and let pr
be the distribution of real data points over X . The idealised minimax GAN
(IMM-GAN) is the game specified by the objective
min
G
max
D
VIMM(D,G), (2.2.1)
where G : Z → X , D : X → [0, 1], and
VIMM(D,G) = Ex∼pr [log(D(x))] + Ez∼pz [log(1−D(G(z)))]. (2.2.2)
Remark 2.2.2. We observe that VIMM is the sum of two expected-value terms.
The first of these captures the idea that the discriminator wants to mark with high
probability points from the real data set. The second of these terms captures that
the discriminator also wants to mark with low probability points from the synthetic
data set. It also captures the contrasting goal of the generator, which is to fool the
discriminator into marking synthetic points with high probability.
Remark 2.2.3. This set-up is idealised, in that it searches for the optimal D and
G over the space of all functions with the correct domain and co-domain.
Using this specification of the GAN game, we wish to show that the objective
function is met precisely when pr = pG. If this is the case, then a GAN is successfully
trained if and only if the generator distribution matches the target distribution: this
is precisely what we require of GANs. To show this, we first give a result specifying
the optimal discriminator, given a fixed generator.
Theorem 2.2.4 (Goodfellow et al. (2014), Proposition 1). Fix G in the IMM-GAN
game. The optimal discriminator D as required by the maximisation term in (2.2.1)
is given by
D∗(x) =
pr(x)
pr(x) + pG(x)
. (2.2.3)
Proof. Maximising VIMM with respect to D is equivalent to maximising
VIMM(D,G) = Ex∼pr [log(D(x))] + Ez∼pz [log(1−D(G(z)))]
=
∫
X
pr(x) log(D(x)) dx+
∫
Z
pz(z) log(1−D(G(z))) dz
=
∫
X
[
pr(x) log(D(x)) + pG(x) log(1−D(x))
]
dx.
For any (a, b) ∈ R2 \ {(0, 0)}, the function y 7→ a log y + b log(1 − y) achieves its
maximum in [0, 1] at a
a+b
. Since the discriminator does not need to be defined outside
of the values of x for which pr and pG are non-zero, this concludes the proof.
Corollary 2.2.5 (Goodfellow et al. (2014)). The IMM-GAN game is equivalent to
finding
min
G
C(G), (2.2.4)
where G : Z → X , and
C(G) = Ex∼pr
[
log
pr(x)
pr(x) + pG(x)
]
+ Ex∼pG
[
log
pG(x)
pr(x) + pG(x)
]
. (2.2.5)
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2.3 Divergences for GANs
To show that the IMM-GAN objective function makes sense, we need to introduce
one last important element: the notion of a divergence between two probability
distributions. This is akin to a measure of distance between two distributions: if we
minimise the divergence, we also hope that the two distributions are in fact equal.
Divergences come up again in the next chapter, but for now it suffices to consider
two possible definitions of divergence.
Definition 2.3.1. Let µ and ν be two probability measures, and suppose µ is
absolutely continuous with respect to ν. The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence
from ν to µ is defined as
dKL (µ‖ν) = Ex∼µ
[
log
µ(x)
ν(x)
]
= Ex∼µ[log µ(x)− log ν(x)]. (2.3.1)
The Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence is defined as
dJS (µ‖ν) = 1
2
dKL (µ‖M) + 1
2
dKL (ν‖M) , (2.3.2)
where M = (µ+ ν)/2.
Two important properties of these divergences make them useful as a notion of
the difference between two distributions.3
Proposition 2.3.2 (Kullback and Leibler (1951), Lemma 3.1). Let µ, ν be two
distributions for which the KL divergence is defined. Then dKL (µ‖ν) is non-negative,
and equal to 0 if and only if µ and ν are equal almost everywhere. If µ and ν are
discrete probability distributions, this is equivalent to µ being equal to ν.
Proof. This proof relies on log being concave, and − log thus being convex. Consider
the case in which µ and ν are continuous probability distributions (the proof works
for discrete distributions mutatis mutandis). Then, by Jensen’s inequality:
dKL (µ‖ν) = Ex∼µ
[
log
µ(x)
ν(x)
]
=
∫
−µ(x) log ν(x)
µ(x)
dx
≥ − log
(∫
µ(x) · ν(x)
µ(x)
dx
)
= − log(1) = 0.
Hence, dKL (µ‖ν) ≥ 0. If µ = ν almost everywhere, then it is clear from the definition
that dKL (µ‖ν) = 0. Moreover, since log is a strictly convex function, then the weak
inequality is an equality only if µ = ν almost everywhere.
3The KL divergence is not a distance function as it is not symmetric - it is possible that
dKL (µ‖ν) 6= dKL (ν‖µ) . For an example of this, see Goodfellow (2016, Figure 14). The JS diver-
gence is a symmetrised version of the KL divergence.
8
Corollary 2.3.3. Let µ, ν be two distributions for which the JS divergence is defined.
Then dJS (µ‖ν) is non-negative, and equal to 0 if and only if µ and ν are equal almost
everywhere. If µ and ν are discrete probability distributions, this is equivalent to µ
being equal to ν.
Proof. This follows from the above proposition, and noting that the JS divergence
is defined as the sum of two (non-negative) KL divergences.
2.4 Appropriateness of Objective Function
The following theorem shows that the choice of objective function for the IMM-GAN
is well-motivated.
Theorem 2.4.1 (Goodfellow et al. (2014), Theorem 1). The global minimum of
the training criterion C(G) is achieved if and only if pr = pG. At that point, C(G)
achieves the value − log 4.
Proof. For pr = pG, (2.2.3) gives us that D
∗(x) = 1
2
, so that C(G) = log 1
2
+ log 1
2
=
− log 4. To see that this is the minimal value of C(G), reached only for pr = pG,
observe that
Ex∼pr [− log 2] + Ex∼pG [− log 2] = − log 4.
By subtracting this expression from C(G) = V (D∗, G), we obtain:
C(G) = − log 4 + dKL
(
pr‖pdata + pG
2
)
+ dKL
(
pG‖pr + pG
2
)
= − log 4 + 2 · dJS (pr‖pG) .
Since the JS divergence between two distributions is always non-negative and
zero only when the distributions are equal, we have that C∗ = − log 4 is the global
minimum of C(G) whose only solution is pr = pG.
Using this proof, we may also establish that in the ideal case in which we may
make updates within the function space, a broad class of convex optimisation algo-
rithms may find this unique solution.
Theorem 2.4.2 (Adapted from Goodfellow et al. (2014), Proposition 2). The func-
tion
U(pG, D) = Ex∼pr [logD(x)] + Ex∼pG [log(1−D(x))].
is convex in pG.
Proof. We observe that only the second term depends on pG. The proof then follows
from the linearity of expectation.
2.5 Practical Implementation of GANs
In practice we do not search over all possible functions G and D for our optima.
Instead, we consider a family of parametrised functions G(z; θG) and D(x; θD) and
optimise parameters θG ∈ ΘG and θD ∈ ΘD. The typical class of parametrised
functions we consider are neural networks, often abbreviated to neural nets.
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Figure 2.1: Samples of images of bedrooms generated by a GAN trained on the
LSUN dataset, taken from Goodfellow (2016).
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A precise formalisation of neural nets is beyond the scope of this dissertation:
the interested reader is referred to Goodfellow et al. (2016, Chapter 6). It suffices to
know that neural nets have the power to approximate a broad class of functions, and
are differentiable with respect to their defining parameters. The latter fact means
that an objective function defined in terms of a neural net may be maximised (resp.
minimised) by taking steps in the parameter space proportional to the negative
(resp. the positive) of the gradient, in a process referred to as gradient descent.4
Restricting our generator and discriminator to be neural nets allows for the GAN
to be implemented and trained in practice.
Algorithm 1 Minibatch stochastic gradient descent training of MM-GANs (Good-
fellow et al., 2014). The gradient-based updates can use any standard gradient-based
learning rule.
1: for number of training iterations do
2: for k steps do
3: Sample minibatch of m noise samples
{
z(1), ..., z(m)
}
from noise prior pz(z).
4: Sample minibatch of m examples
{
x(1), ..., x(m)
}
from real data distribution
pr.
5: Update the discriminator by ascending its stochastic gradient:
∇θD
1
m
m∑
i=1
[
logD
(
x(i)
)
+ log
(
1−D(G(z(i))))].
6: end for
7: Sample minibatch of m noise samples
{
z(1), ..., z(m)
}
from noise prior pz(z).
8: Update the generator by descending its stochastic gradient:
∇θG
1
m
m∑
i=1
log
(
1−D(G(z(i)))).
9: end for
We formalise the new objective as follows:
Definition 2.5.1 (MM-GAN). Let Z ⊆ R`, X ⊆ Rd be ambient data spaces, let
pz(z) be a prior distribution over Z, and let pr be the distribution of real data points
over X . Let ΘD and ΘG be the spaces of possible parameters for the discriminator
and generator, respectively.5 The minimax GAN (MM-GAN) is the game specified
by the objective
min
θG∈ΘG
max
θD∈ΘD
VMM(DθD , GθG), (2.5.1)
where GθG : Z → X , DθD : X → [0, 1] belong to classes of neural nets
F = {GθG | θG ∈ ΘG},
G = {DθD | θD ∈ ΘD},
4The objective-maximising equivalent is also referred to as gradient ascent.
5Typically, ΘD and ΘG are subsets of the unit ball.
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and
VMM(DθD , GθG) = Ex∼pr [log(DθD(x))] + Ez∼pz [log(1−DθD(GθD(z)))]. (2.5.2)
2.6 Convergence Problems
Unlike its idealised counterpart, the MM-GAN objective function lacks counter-
parts to Theorems 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 that guarantee convergence to a unique solution
such that pr = pG. This section reviews two particular problems with convergence
observed when implementing this GANs in practice, and considers the theoretical
explanations of their origins that have been offered. The remainder of this dis-
sertation will focus on theoretically-motivated modifications of GANs that seek to
ameliorate these problems.
2.6.1 Failure to Improve
There are two ways in which our generator may fail to improve, where the im-
provement is taken with respect to the quality of samples it produces. In the first
case, though a solution may exist, the dynamics of the gradient descent training
algorithm prevents the neural nets from reaching their optimal parameter values.
Example 4.4.1 demonstrates this.
In the second case, which is a special case of the first failure, the gradient along
which the generator must train is diminished to the point that the generator cannot
usefully learn from it. This is known as the vanishing gradient problem, or the
saturation problem. Goodfellow et al. (2014) claims that this problem is caused
by the discriminator successfully rejecting generator samples with high confidence,
so that the generator’s gradient vanishes. This suggests that we ought to avoid
over-training the discriminator, and instead carefully interplay discriminator and
generator improvements.
2.6.2 Mode Collapse
Mode collapse is a problem that occurs when the generator learns to produce only
a limited range of samples from the real data distribution. It does so by mapping
several different input values z ∼ pz to the same output point G(z).
The name ‘mode collapse’ comes from the fact that, when trying to learn a multi-
modal distribution, the generator only outputs samples from a select number of these
modes. Metz et al. (2016) demonstrates this by showing how a GAN may fail to
learn a toy data distribution consisting of a mixture of 2D Gaussian distributions
(as seen in Figure 2.2).
Goodfellow et al. (2014) and Metz et al. (2016) postulate that mode collapse
arises from the following fact, which I shall state and prove rigorously:
Proposition 2.6.1. Fix a continuous D in the IMM-GAN game, and let X be
compact.6 The optimal generator G as required by the outer loop of (2.2.1) is given
6The assumption of compactness for our data space makes sense in a practical context. By
the Heine-Borel Theorem, a subset of Euclidean space is compact if and only if it is closed and
bounded. Representations of real data often take this form: for example, a grayscale image can be
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Figure 2.2: An illustration of mode collapse on a toy dataset consisting of a mixture
of Gaussians in two-dimensional space. In the bottom row, we see how as the GAN
is trained over time, the generator only produces a single mode at a time, cycling
between different modes as the discriminator learns to reject each one. Image taken
from Metz et al. (2016).
by
G∗(z) = sz ∀z ∈ Z, (2.6.1)
where sz ∈ arg maxx∈X D(x). In other words, the optimal generator for a fixed dis-
criminator maps every value z ∈ Z to some x ∈ X that the discriminator believes
is most likely to be real rather than fake.
Proof. Since the discriminator is continuous with a compact domain, the set
arg maxx∈X D(x) is non-empty. We observe that only the second term in the value
function
Ex∼pr [log(D(x))] + Ez∼pz [log(1−D(G(z)))]
depends on G. Since log is a monotone function, we wish to choose G so as to
minimise (1−D(G(z))), or equivalently, so as to maximise D(G(z)). From this the
statement follows.
Corollary 2.6.2. Define C˜(D) := minG VIMM(D,G). Let pr be any real data distri-
bution with support on X compact. Then there exists a discriminator D such that
C˜(D) = minGC(G), but pr 6= pG.
Proof. By the above result,
C˜(D) = Ex∼pr [logD(x)] + log(1−max
y∈X
D(y)). (2.6.2)
Taking D to be constantly 1/2, we get that C˜(D) = − log 4 = minGC(G). How-
ever, this value for C˜(D) can be attained for any G whose value is constantly
arg maxy∈X D(y). In particular, it can be attained for a G such that pr 6= pG.
Suppose we viewed the objective of MM-GAN as finding
max
θD∈ΘD
min
θG∈ΘG
VMM(DθD , GθG).
given by a finite-dimensional vector of values in [0, 1], and so the space of all such grayscale images
will be compact. Hence, compactness is assumed here and elsewhere without loss of practical
generality.
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By the above proposition, this approach seemingly encourages a scenario in which
the generator favours producing only one output. The problem with the GAN
training algorithm, according to Goodfellow (2016), is that it does not demonstrate
any preference over the maximin and minimax perspective. As emphasised by
Arjovsky et al. (2017), this suggests we should seek to train the discriminator to
optimality before each step of generator training.
However, this runs counter to the advice given to resolve the problem of conver-
gence failure. As such, we need to modify our GAN design so that we may train the
discriminator to optimality, avoiding the issue of mode collapse, while at the same
time avoiding convergence failures.
14
Chapter 3
The Topology of GANs
In the previous chapter, we saw that the original GAN (Goodfellow et al., 2014)
formulation suffered from problems of convergence failure and mode collapse
during the training procedure. In this chapter, I review a generalisation of the
GAN objective function due to Liu et al. (2017) and Zhang et al. (2017). This
generalisation gives us a deeper theoretical insight into the conditions that must be
satisfied for a GAN to be able to successfully reproduce samples from a distribution.
Recall that, fixing an optimal discriminator and allowing updates to the function
space, finding an optimal generator is equivalent to minimising the Jensen-Shannon
(JS) divergence between the generator distribution pG and the real data distribution,
pr. The generalisation in this chapter, taking this as inspiration, shows how changing
our choice of objective function makes finding the optima of that function equivalent
to minimising some divergence between the two distributions.
Of course, convergence depends on our choice of distance or divergence ρ(pθ, pr)
between these distributions. This chapter develops the argument in Arjovsky et al.
(2017) that GAN training demands a distance notion dW that induces a weaker
topology than dJS, in that the set of convergent sequences under dW will be a su-
perset of that under dJS. I shall then show the positive theoretical results of the
corresponding GAN procedure, Wasserstein GAN (WGAN).
3.1 Adversarial Divergences
In Chapter 2, we established that, given an optimal discriminator, we can view
the IMM-GAN game as a minimisation problem for the generator. In particular,
Corollary 2.2.5 showed that the IMM-GAN game was equivalent to finding
min
G
(
Ex∼pr
[
log
pr(x)
pr(x) + pG(x)
]
+ Ex∼pG
[
log
pG(x)
pr(x) + pG(x)
])
.
Liu et al. (2017) generalises this approach, viewing a GAN as seeking to minimise
the objective function
pG 7→ sup
f∈F
Ex∼pr,y∼pG [f(x, y)] (3.1.1)
for some class F of functions.1 This leads to the concept of adversarial divergence.
1That our objective function is defined on a distribution space rather than a parameter space
shows that this approach is ‘idealised’ in the sense given in the previous chapter.
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Definition 3.1.1 (Modified from Liu et al. (2017), Definition 1). Let X be an
arbitrary topological space, F ⊆ [0, 1](X 2) our class of functions with domain X 2.
An adversarial divergence dτ over X is a function
Prob(X )× Prob(X )→ R ∪ {+∞}
(µ, ν) 7→ dτ (µ‖ν) =: sup
f∈F
Eµ⊗ν [f ].
Example 3.1.2 (IMM-GAN (Goodfellow et al., 2014)). If we set
F = {x, y 7→ log(D(x)) + log(1−D(y)) | D ∈ V}, (3.1.2)
where V = [0, 1]X , we recover our IMM-GAN objective with optimal discriminator,
C(G).
Example 3.1.3 (Integral Probability Metric (Mu¨ller, 1997)). We derive a particu-
larly important class of GANs when we assume that, in the definition of adversarial
divergence, we can write our bivariate function f as the difference of two univariate
functions.
In particular, given a choice2 of F , an integral probability metric (IPM)
between two distributions is defined
dIPM (µ‖ν) := sup
f∈F
(
Ex∼µ[f(x)]− Ey∼ν [f(y)]
)
. (3.1.3)
Proposition 3.1.4. Suppose that our function class F is such that, if f ∈ F , then
−f ∈ F . Then dIPM (µ‖ν) is non-negative, satisfies the triangle inequality, and is
symmetric.
Proof. The proof follows easily from the properties of the supremum.
3.2 Wasserstein GAN
This section defines the Wasserstein GAN (WGAN), which can be shown to arise
from a particular choice of IPM. WGAN was originally developed by Arjovsky et al.
(2017), after being theoretically motivated in Arjovsky and Bottou (2017). The
theory has been developed further by Bousquet et al. (2017) and Lei et al. (2017).
3.2.1 Earth-Mover Distance and Total Variation Distance
We first define two notions of distance between probability distributions, both of
which can be shown to be examples of IPMs.
Definition 3.2.1. Let µ, ν be probability measures on a compact metric space
(X , d). The Earth-Mover (EM) or Wasserstein-1 distance is given by
dW (µ‖ν) := inf
γ∈Π(µ,ν)
E(x,y)∼γ[‖x− y‖], (3.2.1)
2Refer to Zhang et al. (2017) for an exploration of the consequences of our choice to F on how
useful the consequent metric is, as well as the extent to which the empirical error bounds will
generalise to true error bounds.
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where Π(µ, ν) denotes the set of all joint distributions γ(x, y) such that, for all
A ∈ B(X ),
γ(A,X ) = µ(A),
γ(X , A) = ν(A).
Intuitively, γ(x, y) indicates how much ‘mass’ must be transported from x to y in
order to transform the distribution µ into the distribution ν.
The following equivalent formula is more tractable when finding minima with
respect to the Wasserstein distance.
Theorem 3.2.2 (The Kantorovich-Rubinstein Duality). Let (X , d) be a compact
metric space, and let Lip1(X ) be the set of functions f : X → R such that
‖f‖L := sup
{ |f(x)− f(y)|
d(x, y)
∣∣∣∣ x, y ∈ X , x 6= y} ≤ 1.
Then f ∈ Lip1(X ) is Lebesgue integrable with respect to any probability measure on
X , and
dW (µ‖ν) = sup
f∈Lip1(X )
(Ex∼µ[f(x)]− Ex∼ν [f(x)]). (3.2.2)
Proof. The result is a standard one in optimal transport theory. See, e.g., Villani
(2008, Theorem 5.10) for a proof. An alternate proof can be found in Edwards
(2011, Theorem 4.1). The presentation here is an adaptation of the latter approach,
as given by Basso (2015, Theorem 1.3).
Since f is 1-Lipschitz, we have for some x0 ∈ X that
|f(x)| ≤ |f(x0)|+ d(x, x0). (3.2.3)
Since X is compact, for any probability measure P on X we can integrate both
sides of (3.2.3) with respect to P to obtain∫
X
|f(x)| dP ≤
∫
X
(|f(x0)|+ d(x, x0)) dP ≤ +∞.
Now let B∞(X ) be the set of all bounded Borel-measurable functions f : X → R.
For f, g : X → R, we define (f ⊕ g) : X 2 → R by
(f ⊕ g)(x, y) := f(x) + g(y).
Observe that since µ, ν are probability measures on a compact metric space, they
are (bounded non-negative) Radon measures. Further, d : X 2 → R is continuous,
and hence lower semicontinuous, as a distance metric. By Corollary 3.2 of Edwards
(2011), we have that
dW (µ‖ν) = sup
{∫
X
f dµ+
∫
X
g dν | f, g ∈ B∞(X ), (f ⊕ g) ≤ d
}
.
Fix ε > 0. By the Approximation Lemma, there exists f, g ∈ B∞(X ) with
(f ⊕ g) ≤ d such that
dW (µ‖ν)− ε ≤
∫
X
f dµ+
∫
X
g dν.
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Now define k : X → R by k(x) := infy∈X (d(x, y)− g(y)). Since g is bounded, k
is well-defined. Then, for x, x′ ∈ X , we have that
|k(x)− k(x′)| = | inf
y∈X
(d(x, y)− g(y))− inf
y∈X
(d(x′, y)− g(y))|
≤ sup
y∈X
|d(x, y)− d(x′, y)|
≤ d(x, x′).
Hence k ∈ Lip1(X ). Note further that, for all x ∈ X ,
f(x) ≤ k(x) ≤ d(x, x)− g(x) = −g(x),
so f ≤ k and g ≤ −k. Now let γ ∈ Π(µ, ν). We then get
dW (µ‖ν)− ε ≤
∫
X
f dµ+
∫
X
g dν
≤
∫
X
k dµ−
∫
X
k dν
≤ sup
{∫
X
f dµ−
∫
X
f dν | f ∈ Lip1(X )
}
≤ sup
{∫
X×X
(f ⊕−f) dγ | f ∈ Lip1(X )
}
≤
∫
X×X
d(x, y) dγ(dx, dy).
Letting ε→ 0, we get the desired equality.
Corollary 3.2.3. The EM distance is an IPM, so long as the domain X of our
function class F is a compact metric space.
The following corollary tells us that it makes sense to describe the EM distance
as a distance, and to talk of it inducing a topology.
Corollary 3.2.4 (Basso (2015), Corollary 1.4). Let (X , d) be a compact metric
space. Then dW defines a metric on Prob(X ).
Proof. That dW is symmetric and non-negative is clear from (3.2.1), and that it
obeys the triangle inequality is clear from (3.2.2). Hence it remains to show that for
probability measures µ, ν on a compact metric space (X , d) that if dW (µ‖ν) = 0,
then µ = ν.
Let F be a closed subset of X . For each integer k ≥ 1, we define fk : X → R by
fk(x) := 1∧ (k ·dist(x, F )). Then it follows that, for each integer k, fk/k ∈ Lip1(X ).
Furthermore, since dW (µ‖ν) = 0, (3.2.2) gives us that, for all k ≥ 1,
1
k
∫
X
fk dµ =
1
k
∫
X
fk dν. (3.2.4)
Observe that (fk)k≥1 is a non-negative sequence of functions converging monoton-
ically to the indicator function on X \ F , an open set. Hence, by the Monotone
Convergence Theorem and (3.2.4), it follows that µ(X \F ) = ν(X \F ). Since open
subsets of X generate B(X ), it follows by Dynkin’s Lemma that µ = ν.
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We obtain similar results for the Total Variation distance between two dis-
tributions.
Definition 3.2.5. The Total Variation (TV) distance between µ and ν is defined
dTV (µ‖ν) = sup
A∈B(X )
|µ(A)− ν(A)|. (3.2.5)
Proposition 3.2.6. The TV distance is an IPM, where F is the set of of all mea-
surable functions bounded between -1 and 1.
Proof. See Mu¨ller (1997).
Corollary 3.2.7. The TV distance defines a metric on Prob(X ).
Proof. By Corollary 3.1.4, it suffices to prove that dTV (µ‖ν) = 0 implies µ = ν.
But this is given from the definition of dTV as a supremum: in particular, µ and ν
are equal on all Borel measurable subsets, and so must be equal.
3.2.2 The Weakness of the Wasserstein Distance
We now seek to show that, in some rigorous sense, minimising Wasserstein distance
is a more suitable framework for GAN training than minimising the Jensen-Shannon
divergence. The adversarial divergence framework enables us to view the objective
of GANs as the minimisation of some divergence between our generator distribution
pG and our target distribution pr. Moreover, the framework can be used to consider
the training of a GAN as the convergence of pG to pr with respect to the given
divergence.
With distinct definitions of convergence come distinct induced topologies.3 The
idea of convergence gives rise to an idea of a topology induced by the divergence.
Notably, we ought to seek some divergence that give us a weak topology, in that the
convergence of pG to pr with respect to other divergences implies convergence with
respect to our ideal divergence. Using the language of functional analysis, it can be
shown that the Wasserstein distance meets this desideratum.4
Let X be a compact set. Taking the sup-norm ‖f‖∞ = maxx∈X |f(x)|, the space
(Cb(X ), ‖·‖∞) is a normed vector space. We can then define the dual normed space
(Cb(X )∗, ‖·‖), where we take
Cb(X )∗ := {φ : Cb(X )→ R | φ is linear and continuous.}
‖φ‖ := sup
f∈Cb(X ),‖f‖∞≤1
|φ(f)|.
Consider the mapping
Φ: (Prob(X ), dTV)→ (Cb(X )∗, ‖·‖)
Φ(µ)(f) := Ex∼µ[f(x)].
By linearity of expectation, this function indeed maps to the appropriate dual
space and so is well-defined. Therefore, by the Riesz-Markov-Kakutani represen-
tation theorem (Kakutani, 1941, Theorem 10), Φ is an isometric immersion. This
3Not all divergences define metrics (e.g., the KL and reverse-KL divergence). As a result, a
given adversarial divergence may not give us a topology in a strictly formal sense.
4This argument can be found in Arjovsky et al. (2017, Appendix A).
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allows us to regard convergence in TV distance and convergence with respect to
‖·‖ as essentially equivalent. This is unfortunate for the TV distance: convergence
with respect to the latter norm in Cb(X )∗ is regarded as ‘strong’ convergence,5 in
effect limiting the capacity of a TV-based GAN to train towards a variety of real
distributions.
By contrast, Cb(X )∗ also comes equipped with a much weaker topology.
Definition 3.2.8 (e.g., Liu et al. (2017), Definitions 7-8). Let X be a compact metric
space. The weak∗ topology for Prob(X ) is the coarsest topology on Prob(X ) such
that
{µ 7→ Eµ[f ] | f ∈ Cb(X )}
is a set of continuous linear functions on Prob(X ).
Moreover, we say that a sequence (µn) ⊆ Prob(X ) weakly converges to a
measure µ ∈ Prob(X ) if, for all f ∈ Cb(X ),
Eµn [f ]→ Eµ[f ] as n→∞,
or equivalently, if µn → µ in the weak∗ topology.
If we can show that the Wasserstein distance captures the notion of weak∗ con-
vergence, then we may claim that the WGAN gives us a more suitable choice of
objective function than any other GAN. We can go further than this by providing
a hierarchy of divergences with respect to their convergence.
Theorem 3.2.9 (Arjovsky et al. (2017), Theorem 2). Let X be compact, and let
µ, (µn) ⊆ Prob(X ). Then, considering all limits as n→∞,
1. dTV (µn‖µ)→ 0 if and only if dJS (µn‖µ)→ 0.
2. dW (µn‖µ)→ 0 if and only if µn d−→ µ, where d−→ denotes convergence in distri-
bution.
3. If either dKL (µ‖µn)→ 0 or dKL (µn‖µ)→ 0, then dJS (µn‖µ)→ 0.
4. If dJS (µn‖µ)→ 0, then dW (µn‖µ)→ 0.
Proof.
1. See Appendix A.
2. This comes from the standard result that dW gives a metric for the weak
∗
topology of (Cb(X ), ‖·‖∞) on Prob(X ), and by definition, this is the topology
of convergence in distribution. For a proof, see Villani (2008, Theorem 6.9).
3. By Pinsker’s Inequality (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006, Section A.2, p. 371),
either case gives us one of
dTV (µn‖µ) ≤
√
1
2
dKL (µ‖µn)→ 0,
dTV (µn‖µ) ≤
√
1
2
dKL (µn‖µ)→ 0.
5It is referred to as such in the standard literature. For example, see Kreyszig (1978, Definition
4.9-4).
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4. This comes from the fact, as argued above, that dTV and dW give the strong
and weak∗ topologies on the dual of (Cb(X ), ‖·‖∞) when restricted to the space
of probability measures on X .
Finally, we observe how even a simple sequence of probability distributions con-
verges under dW but not under dJS or dKL. This serves as a witness to Theorem 3.2.9.
Example 3.2.10 (Arjovsky et al. (2017), Example 1). Let Z ∼ U [0, 1] be uniformly
distributed over the unit interval. Let P0 be the distribution of (0, Z) ∈ R2. Now let
gθ(z) = (θ, z), with θ ∈ R and Pθ the distribution for gθ(Z). In this case:
• dW (P0‖Pθ) = |θ|,
• dJS (P0‖Pθ) =
{
log 2 if θ 6= 0,
0 if θ = 0,
• and dKL (Pθ‖P0) = dKL (P0‖Pθ) =
{
+∞ if θ 6= 0,
0 if θ = 0.
Hence, when θn → 0, the sequence (Pθn)n∈N converges to P0 only under the Wasser-
stein distance.
3.2.3 On the Viability of WGAN
In the above example, the JS divergence fails to give us continuous mapping θ 7→ Pθ,
a desirable property. The next theorem shows us that, under mild assumptions,
dW (µ‖µθ) is a continuous loss function on θ.
Theorem 3.2.11 (Arjovsky et al. (2017), Theorem 1). Let X be compact, and let
µ ∈ Prob(X ). Let Z be a random variable over another space Z. Let g : Z×Rd → X
be a function, denoted gθ(z). Let µθ denote the distribution of gθ(Z). Then,
1. If g is continuous in θ, so is dW (µ‖µθ),
2. If g is locally Lipschitz and there are local Lipschitz constants L(θ, z) such that
Ez∼µθ [L(θ, z)] < +∞,
then dW (µ‖µθ) is continuous everywhere, and differentiable almost everywhere.
3. Statements 1-2 are false for dJS and the two KL divergences.
Proof.
1. Let γ be the distribution of (gθ(Z), gθ′(Z)), so that γ ∈ Π(µθ, µθ′). Then
(3.2.1) gives us
dW (µθ‖µθ′) ≤
∫
X×X
‖x− y‖ dγ
= E(x,y)∼γ[‖x− y‖]
= EZ [‖gθ(Z)− gθ′(Z)‖].
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Since g is continuous in θ, we have that gθ(z)
θ→θ′−−−→ gθ′(z). Hence
‖gθ − gθ′‖ → 0
point-wise in z. Since X is compact, there exists a positive constant M ,
independent of θ and z, such that for all θ, z, we have ‖gθ(z) − gθ′(z)‖ ≤ M .
By the Bounded Convergence Theorem,
|dW (µ‖µθ)− dW (µ‖µθ′)| ≤ dW (µθ‖µθ′)
≤ EZ [‖gθ(z)− gθ′(z)‖]
θ→θ′−−−→ 0.
The result follows.
2. Take g to be locally Lipschitz. This means that, fixing (θ, z), there exists a
constant L(θ, z) and open set U such that (θ, z) ∈ U , and for every (θ′, z′) ∈ U ,
‖gθ(z)− gθ′(z′)‖ ≤ L(θ, z)(‖θ − θ′‖+ ‖z − z′‖). (3.2.6)
Fix z′ = z. Taking the expectation in (3.2.6), we have for all (θ′, z) ∈ U that
EZ [‖gθ(z)− gθ′(z)‖] ≤ ‖θ − θ′‖ · EZ [L(θ, z)].
Define Uθ := {θ′ | (θ′, z) ∈ U}. Since U is open, Uθ is also open. Hence, by
hypothesis, we may define L(θ) := EZ [L(θ, z)] and get for all θ′ ∈ Uθ that
|dW (µ‖µθ)− dW (µ‖µθ′)| ≤ dW (µθ‖µθ′) ≤ L(θ) · ‖θ − θ′‖.
Hence dW (µ‖µθ) is locally Lipschitz. Therefore, dW (µ‖µθ) is everywhere con-
tinuous, and, by Rademacher’s Theorem (Federer, 2014, Theorem 3.1.6), dif-
ferentiable almost everywhere.
3. Observe that Example 3.2.10 serves as the required counterexample.
Of course, in practice our generator functions will be neural nets. The following
corollary shows that the previous result holds if we restrict our attention to these
kinds of functions.
Corollary 3.2.12 (Arjovsky et al. (2017), Corollary 1). Let gθ be any feedforward
neural net6 parametrised by θ, and pz a prior over z such that Ez∼pz [‖z‖] <∞. Then
the assumptions of Theorem 3.2.11 are satisfied, and so dW (µ‖µθ) is continuous
everywhere and differentiable almost everywhere.
Proof. Since g is a continuously differentiable function in (θ, z), for any fixed (θ, z),
we have for all ε > 0 that L(θ, z) ≤ ‖∇θ,xgθ(z)‖+ ε is an acceptable local Lipschitz
constant. It therefore remains to show that
Ez∼pz [‖∇θ,xgθ(z)‖] < +∞. (3.2.7)
This part of the proof is omitted. Refer to Arjovsky et al. (2017, Appendix C) for
the technical details.
6In other words, a function composed by affine transformations and pointwise nonlinearities
which are smooth Lipschitz functions.
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3.2.4 The WGAN Procedure
Evaluating dW (pr‖pθ), where pθ is the distribution of our generator gθ, is often
intractable. A more tractable approach, justified by the Kantorovich-Rubinstein
Duality, would be to solve the problem
max
w∈W
(
Ex∼pr [fw(x)]− Ez∼pz(z)[fw(gθ(z))]
)
, (3.2.8)
where {fw}w∈W is a set of parametrised functions that are all K-Lipschitz for some
K. If the supremum in (3.2.2) is attained for some w ∈ W , this process would yield
a calculation of dW (pr‖pθ) up to a multiplicative constant K.
To minimise dW (pr‖pθ) with respect to θ, we could consider differentiating
dW (pr‖pθ) (up to a constant) by using back-propagation through equation (3.2.2)
via estimating Ez∼pz(z)[∇θfw(gθ(z))]. The following theorem shows that this process
is principled under the assumptions of the previous results.
Theorem 3.2.13 (Arjovsky et al. (2017), Theorem 3). Let X be compact, and let
pr ∈ Prob(X ). Let pθ be the distribution of gθ(Z) with Z a random variable with
density pz and gθ a function satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 3.2.11. Then,
there is a solution f : X → R to the problem
max
f∈Lip1(X )
(
Ex∼pr [f(x)]− Ex∼pθ [f(x)]
)
and we have
∇θdW (pr‖pθ) = −Ez∼pz(z)[∇θf(gθ(z))]
when both terms are well-defined.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix A.
To roughly approximate finding the function f that solves (3.2.2), Arjovsky et al.
(2017) train a neural network parametrised with weights w lying in a compact space
W , and then perform back-propagation through Ez∼pz(z)[∇θfw(gθ(z))].7
Here, we refer to fw as our critic, just as the original GAN had a discriminator
D. When W is compact,8 all the functions fw will be K-Lipschitz for some K
depending only on W and not the individual weights w, allowing us approximate
(3.2.2) up to an irrelevant scaling factor.
3.2.5 Does WGAN Resolve Convergence Problems?
Mode Collapse
Arjovsky et al. recommend that WGAN critics be trained to optimality. In so doing,
they claim, one avoids the phenomenon of mode collapse. The argument for this
relies on the Goodfellow-Metz explanation for mode collapse. The reasoning is as
7Refer to Algorithm 1 in Arjovsky et al. (2017) for the precise formulation of the WGAN
algorithm.
8This is enforced in the WGAN algorithm given by Arjovsky et al. (2017) by clipping the weights
within a fixed hypercube, say W = [−0.01, 0.01]l, after each gradient update. See Gulrajani et al.
(2017) for an alternate approach to enforcing the Lipschitz constraint by adding a ‘gradient penalty’
term to the discriminator loss function.
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follows: the hypothesis is that mode collapse comes from the fact (Proposition 2.6.1)
that the optimal generator for a given discriminator is a map to the points for which
the discriminator assigns the highest probability, so that each generator update step
in training the MM-GAN is a partial collapse towards this function. Therefore,
if the discriminator is close enough to optimality, the data points to which it will
assign the highest probability will be precisely those that arise from the real data
distribution pr, and so an optimal generator function given this discriminator will
be a delta function valued 1 on all such data points.
It has also been observed empirically that WGANs avoid mode collapse in cases
where the MM-GANs do not (Arjovsky et al., 2017; Fedus et al., 2017; Lucic et al.,
2017).
Failure to Converge
According to Arjovsky et al. (2017), the fact that the EM distance is continuous
and differentiable a.e. means that, unlike the MM-GAN, we can train the critic to
optimality without worrying about the convergence of the generator distribution.
Consider, for instance, the target and generator distributions given in Exam-
ple 3.2.10. Unless the generator distribution has already matched the target dis-
tribution, the JS distance between the two is constantly log 2. This distance, as a
result, gives no meaningful gradient for the generator to use for training, provided
that the discriminator is sufficiently optimal so as to give an accurate estimate of
the JS distance.9 By contrast, the WGAN critic converges to a piecewise linear
function through the constraint of its weights by clipping. In this sense, we see how
the WGAN can tackle the issue of saturation.
9Arjovsky and Bottou (2017, Theorem 2.4) shows that this issue of vanishing gradients for the
MM-GAN generator can be found to occur quite generally.
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Chapter 4
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of
GANs
4.1 Many Paths to Equilibrium
Throughout the previous chapter, I considered the training of GANs as a minimi-
sation of an adversarial divergence, itself the supremum over some loss function.
In doing so, I took the perspective of GANs as optimising a generator, given a
discriminator that is already optimal.
While such an approach does enjoy certain theoretical and empirical successes,1
there are also two potential drawbacks.
Firstly, it may be computationally impractical to train a discriminator to op-
timality at each step. An approach that trains the generator and discriminator
simultaneously, or trains the discriminator for k iterations between each generator
training step may simply converge to the solution more efficiently. When such an
approach is taken with the neural net parameters trained via gradient descent, these
approaches are referred to as simultaneous and alternating gradient descent
(SimGD and AGD), respectively.
Secondly, as we have seen, certain GAN formulations do not perform well with
optimal discriminators: the gradient along which the generator is being optimised
collapses, meaning it converges to its optimum far more slowly. This was observed
in an informal setting for MM-GANs in the original GAN paper by Goodfellow et al.
(2014).
4.1.1 Two Generalisations
In this chapter, I will investigate the consequences of relaxing two constraints im-
plicitly imposed by the adversarial divergence view of training GANs.
1. We will now consider the cases in which the generator and discriminator are
trained via simultaneous or alternating gradient descent. The former approach
has been modelled in Mescheder et al. (2017). The latter was first proposed by
Goodfellow et al. (2014) (Algorithm 1 in this dissertation), with the number
k of discriminator training steps between each generator training step treated
1For instance, in Wasserstein GAN (Arjovsky et al., 2017; Arjovsky and Bottou, 2017).
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as an algorithm hyperparameter to be carefully chosen.2
2. We will allow for the discriminator and generator to be trained on objective
functions whose absolute values differ. In particular, we now consider the
discriminator and generator to seek to minimise loss functions JD and JG,
respectively. Hence, unless JD = −JG as assumed in the previous chapters,
we can no longer express the GAN objective by a single value function V .
For a simple example of a GAN that cannot be expressed by a single value
function, consider the following example.
Definition 4.1.1 (Goodfellow et al. (2014)). Let Z ⊆ R`, X ⊆ Rd be ambient data
spaces, let pz be a prior distribution over Z, and let pr be the distribution of real
data points over X . The non-saturating GAN (NS-GAN) is the game specified
by the minimisation of loss functions
JDNS := Ex∼pr [log(D(x))] + Ez∼pz [log(1−D(G(z)))],
JGNS := −Ez∼pz [logD(G(z))].
where G : Z → X , D : X → [0, 1].
Such a game has been observed to enjoy empirical success: in particular, Fedus
et al. (2017) show that on a variety of datasets, NS-GAN produces samples of a
comparable quality to WGAN and its variants, while being easier to train.3
4.2 A Brief Review of Game Theory
Since the NS-GAN is not expressible by a single value function, our theoretical
results about adversarial divergence minimisation no longer apply. To analyse GAN
examples like NS-GAN, we require a game-theoretic framework. In doing so, we can
provide answers to the following questions:
Do solutions to the GAN game exist? What is the nature of such solu-
tions?
Are there training methods for the discriminator and generator that
allow us to converge to such solutions?
4.2.1 Two-Player Games
We begin with the definition of the type of game we are interested in. Unless stated
otherwise, the definitions and results are adapted from Osborne and Rubinstein
(1994, Chapters 2-3).
2For a comparison between AGD and training the discriminator to optimality on a toy example,
refer to Li et al. (2017).
3Visual inspection is currently one of the most prominent methods of evaluation within the
GAN literature. In general, finding a suitable quantitative evaluation model for GANs is one of
the largest open problems in the field (Goodfellow, 2016, p. 42). Currently, the Inception Score
(Salimans et al., 2016) and the Fre´chet Inception Distance (Ramsauer et al., 2017) are amongst
the most popular performance metrics available.
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Definition 4.2.1. A strategic two-player game 〈(Ai), (ui)〉i=1,2 consists of, for
players i = 1, 2
• a nonempty set Ai (the set of actions available to player i)
• a payoff or utility function ui : A→ R, where A = A1 × A2.
If the set Ai of actions of both players is finite, then the game is finite.
This game is referred to as strategic as each player chooses their plan of action
once and for all, with these choices being made simultaneously. Given such a game,
the most commonly used solution concept is that of a Nash equilibrium. The
Nash equilibrium captures the idea that each player holds the correct expectation
about the other players’ behaviour and acts rationally; in a Nash equilibrium, neither
player can gain by deviating from their strategy.
Definition 4.2.2. Let a−i denote the strategy of player 1 for i = 2, and player 2
for i = 1. A Nash equilibrium of a strategic two-player game 〈(Ai), (ui)〉i=1,2
is a profile a∗ ∈ A of actions with the property that for i = 1, 2 we have
ui(a
∗
−i, a
∗
i ) ≥ ui(a∗−i, ai) for all ai ∈ Ai.
4.2.2 Minimax Games
Definition 4.2.3. A strategic two-player game 〈(Ai), (ui)〉i=1,2 is zero-sum if u1 =
−u2.
Remark 4.2.4. With an appropriate choice of minimax theorem,4 we can show that
an optimal solution to our adversarial divergence objective function exists, and that
it coincides with a Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game.
Unfortunately, such results do not apply to GANs. Typically, a minimax theorem
requires the Ai to be compact and the value function V (·, ·) to be convex in the first
argument and concave in the second. In general, the value function will fail to have
this property due to a lack of expressivity in the discriminator-generator function
space. Even if we allow the discriminator and generator to range over a broader
class of functions, the associated function spaces will no longer be compact. We see
this failure in the mode collapse hypothesis, in which the minimax and maximin
solutions are distinct.
4.2.3 Mixed Extensions to Games
Given that the GAN game consists in practice of making updates to the parameter
space rather than the function space, is there any way we can generalise the notion of
a Nash equilibrium to recover the guarantee of the existence of such an equilibrium
for the game? The answer is a qualified yes.
Our required generalisation is that of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium: this will
be a steady state of the game in which the players’ choices are not deterministic,
but instead determined probabilistically according to some distribution.
4See, e.g., Fan (1953, Theorem 2).
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In particular, we denote by ∆(Ai) the set of probability distributions over Ai
and refer to a member of ∆(Ai) as a mixed strategy
5 of player i. A member of
Ai is referred to as a pure strategy. For any finite set X and δ ∈ ∆(X) we denote
by δ(x) the probability that δ assigns to x ∈ X, and define the support of δ to
be the set of elements x ∈ X such that δ(x) > 0. Given a profile (α1, α2) of mixed
strategies, we have a probability distribution over the set A. If each Ai is finite,
then the probability of the action profile a = (a1, a2) is α1(a1) · α2(a2), and player
i’s evaluation of (α1, α2) is
∑
a∈A(α1(a1) ·α2(a2)) · ui(a). This leads to the following
definition.
Definition 4.2.5. The mixed extension of the strategic two-player game
〈(Ai), (ui)〉i=1,2 is the strategic two-player game 〈(∆(Ai)), (Ui)〉i=1,2 in which ∆(Ai)
is the set of probability distributions over Ai, and Ui : ∆(A1)×∆(A2)→ R assigns to
each α ∈ ∆(A1)×∆(A2) the expected value under ui of the probability distribution
over A induced by α, so that
Ui(α) =
∑
a∈A
(α1(a1) · α2(a2)) · ui(a)
From this definition, it follows that Ui is multilinear: for any mixed strategy
profile α, any mixed strategies βi and γi of player i, and any number λ ∈ [0, 1], that
Ui(α−i, λβi + (1− λ)γi) = λUi(α−i, βi) + (1− λ)Ui(α−i, γi).
Moreover, when each Ai is finite, we have
Ui(α) =
∑
ai∈Ai
αi(ai)Ui(α−i, e(ai))
for any mixed strategy profile α, where e(ai) is the degenerate mixed strategy of
player i corresponding to the pure strategy of just choosing ai.
Definition 4.2.6. A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a strategic two-
player game is a Nash equilibrium of its mixed extension.
It is plain to see, since each Ui is multilinear, and any mixed strategy exclusively
employing degenerate distributions can be readily identified with a strategy in A,
that the set of Nash equilibria of a strategic game is a subset of its set of mixed
strategy Nash equilibria.
In a well-known result, Nash (1950) showed that a mixed strategy Nash equi-
librium is guaranteed to exist if the action spaces A1, A2 are finite. Of course, this
condition fails to hold for the generator and discriminator of a GAN, whose strategy
spaces are parameter spaces in Rn,Rm, respectively. However, we may restrict the
parameter spaces such that the GAN game is a continuous game, where A1, A2
are non-empty compact metric spaces and u1, u2 are continuous functions on A. We
then get a result that applies to the GAN game.
Theorem 4.2.7 (Glicksberg’s Theorem (Glicksberg, 1952)). Let G be a continuous
game, in the sense described above. Then G has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
5The players’ mixed strategies are assumed to be independent.
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Proof Idea. Though Glicksberg’s own proof relies on a generalisation of the fixed-
point theorem used to prove Nash’s existence theorem, an alternative proof given
in Ozdaglar (2010, Lecture 6) makes use of Nash’s existence theorem without any
further fixed-point result. In particular, the continuous game is approximated with
a sequence of finite games, each corresponding to successively finer discretisations
of the original game. Nash’s existence theorem produces an equilibrium for each
approximation, which we can show using the weak topology and the continuity
assumptions to converge to an equilibrium of the original game. The full proof is
given in Section B.1.
4.3 Game-Theoretic Results for GANs
4.3.1 Mixing GANs
Two immediate problems arise with applying Glicksberg’s Theorem to GANs. Firstly,
we may for practical purposes be concerned about the support size of the mixed
strategy. In other words: how many generators does it take to fool a discriminator
of a certain strength? A classical result tells us that, so long as our generators are
capable of producing simple Gaussian distributions, we can arbitrarily approximate
pr. Yet if the support size necessary to achieve this is too large, then training so
many generators will be computationally prohibitive.
Secondly, it is not clear what it means for a generator to employ a mixed strategy.
Of course, the generator induces a probability distribution pG which it aims to
be close to pr. However, this is not the relevant probability distribution when
considering mixed strategies in the GAN game. Instead, a mixed strategy would
be a distribution over the parameters of G - in other words, a mixed strategy is a
probability distribution over functions that induce probability distributions!
Arora et al. (2017) show how a mixture of finitely many generators and discrimi-
nators may approximate the minimax solution of the GAN game. Firstly, we define
such an approximate equilibrium.
Definition 4.3.1. Let 〈(∆(Ai), (Ui)〉i=1,2 be a mixed strategic two-player game, and
let ε > 0. A mixed strategy profile α∗ = (α∗1, α
∗
2) is an ε-approximate equilibrium
for G if, for some i = 1, 2,
Ui(α
∗) ≥ Ui(α′i, α∗−i)− ε for all α′i ∈ ∆(Ai). (4.3.1)
This leads Arora et al. to prove a theorem showing both the existence of an
ε-approximate equilibrium using a finite mixture of generators and single discrim-
inator, and a procedure for constructing an ε-approximate pure equilibrium. In
doing so, we address the two concerns above. This theorem holds for the neural
net divergence, defined here.
Definition 4.3.2 (Arora et al. (2017)). Let X ⊆ Rd be an ambient data space,
let pG be the distribution induced by our generator function, and let pr be the
distribution of real data points over X . Let F be a class of neural networks from
Rd to [0, 1], such that if f ∈ F , then 1 − f ∈ F . Let φ be a measuring function:
that is, φ : [0, 1] → R be concave and monotone. The neural F-divergence with
respect to φ between two distributions µ, ν supported on X is defined as
dF ,φ(µ‖ν) := sup
D∈F
(−JDφ (D, ν)), (4.3.2)
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where
JDφ (D, ν) = −
(
Ex∼µ[φ(D(x))] + Ey∼ν [φ(1−D(y))]
)
(4.3.3)
Remark 4.3.3. Note that, in seeking a generator G that minimises
dF ,φ(pr‖pG),
we are seeking a solution to a zero-sum game, with the loss functions defined as
expected.
Furthermore, the neural net divergence may be seen as a generalisation of the
practical instantiations of the JS and Wasserstein distance (setting φ(x) = log(x)
or φ(x) = x, respectively), where the term ‘practical’ denotes the fact that our
function space consists of neural networks. As such, any results we can prove about
minimising neural net divergence will be highly relevant to the GAN examples most
prominently considered so far.
We are now in a position to give the main positive result with regards to GANs
and the existence of equilibria.
Theorem 4.3.4 (Arora et al. (2017), Theorem 4.3). Let φ be an Lφ-Lipschitz con-
cave measuring function bounded in [−∆,∆], and suppose the generator and discrim-
inators are L-Lipschitz with respect to the parameters and L′-Lipschitz with respect
to inputs. Furthermore, suppose the generator can approximate any point mass: that
is, for all points x and any  > 0, there is a generator such that Ez∼pz [‖G(z)−x‖] ≤ .
Suppose the generator and discriminator are both k-layer neural networks (k ≥ 2)
with p parameters, and the last layer uses the ReLU activation function f(x) =
max{0, x}. Then there exists (k + 1)-layer neural networks of generators G and
discriminator D with O
(
∆2p2 log(LL′Lφ·p/ε)
ε2
)
parameters, such that there exists an ε-
approximate pure equilibrium with value 2φ(1/2) to the game induced by dF ,φ(pr‖pG).
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix B, Section B.2.
We have now seen how, when we consider GANs qua strategic zero-sum two-
player games, we are able to establish the existence of approximate solutions to a
broad variety of GAN games even when taking into account the limitations of the
generator and discriminator functions.
Of course, non-zero-sum games such as the NS-GAN are not covered by this
result, which only applies when the generator and discriminator are optimising for
the same value function. However, as shown previously, Glicksberg’s Theorem guar-
antees the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria for such a game, given the
plausible assumption that the parameter spaces of the neural network are compact.
It is an open problem whether the procedure for producing a single neural network
that simulates a ‘mixed strategy’ can be extended to guarantee the existence of
pure equilibria in non-zero-sum games, or whether we could get a realistic bound
for the support size of such a mixture in exchange for settling for an ε-approximate
equilibrium.
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4.4 Frontiers of Research
In this final section, I will briefly review some of the ongoing research in game theory
that is applicable to better understanding the dynamics and possible solutions of
GAN games.
4.4.1 Existence does not Guarantee Convergence
As Arora et al. (2017, p. 15) observe, in the practical cases in which V (·, ·) is
not convex-concave, the mere existence of an equilibrium does not guarantee that
a simple algorithm like gradient descent will converge to it. The following is a
pathological example.6 for a non-GAN zero-sum game that fails to converge to its
equilibrium using gradient descent.
Example 4.4.1 (Goodfellow (2016), Sections 7.2 and 8.2). Consider a zero-sum
game with two players that each control a single scalar value. The minimising player
controls scalar x, the maximising player controls scalar y, and the value function for
the game is
V (x, y) = xy. (4.4.1)
By solving ∂xV (x, y) = 0 and ∂yV (x, y) = 0, we can establish that there is a saddle
point at x = y = 0. Moreover, this saddle point is a Nash equilibrium: if the
minimising player fixes x = 0, the maximising player cannot attain a better score
than at y = 0, and vice versa.
Now, suppose the players were to learn this equilibrium via SimGD. To simplify
the problem, we imagine that gradient descent is a continuous time process with an
infinitesimal learning rate, so that the SimGD is described by the following system
of partial differential equations:
∂x
∂t
= − ∂
∂x
V (x(t), y(t)), (4.4.2)
∂y
∂t
=
∂
∂y
V (x(t), y(t)). (4.4.3)
Clearly, these evaluate to
∂x
∂t
= −y(t), (4.4.4)
∂y
∂t
= x(t). (4.4.5)
Differentiating (4.4.5) yields
∂2y
∂t2
=
∂x
∂t
= −y(t). (4.4.6)
This differential equation has the solution
x(t) = x(0) cos(t)− y(0) sin(t) (4.4.7)
y(t) = x(0) sin(t) + y(0) cos(t). (4.4.8)
6For further examples, refer to Arora et al. (2017, Appendix C) Moreover, Mertikopoulos et al.
(2018) proves the existence of cycling behaviour for two players adopting another approach for
finding the solution to a zero-sum game.
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Figure 4.1: Images sampled from a Coulomb GAN after training on the CelebA (first
row), LSUN bedrooms (second row), and CIFAR 10 (last row) datasets. Image taken
from Unterthiner et al. (2017).
These dynamics form a circular orbit, so that SimGD with an infinitesimal learn-
ing rate will orbit around the equilibrium forever, at the same radius that it was
initialised. Moreover, a larger learning rate can overshoot, causing SimGD to spiral
outward forever. Hence, unless the players find themselves at the equilibrium upon
initialisation, they will never approach the equilibrium using SimGD.
4.4.2 Convergence to Other Types of Equilibria
Some recent work has established the existence of other types of equilibria that a
GAN will be guaranteed to converge to, or other types of GAN that are guaranteed
to converge to an equilibrium.
As an example of the former, Hazan et al. (2017) defines a natural notion of regret
for the players of a GAN game, and gives gradient-based methods that guarantee
convergence to a newly-defined notion of local, regret-based equilibrium. Though
the paper specifically refers to MM-GAN games, the result can in fact be generalised
to any GAN game whose loss functions are bounded, Lipschitz, and have Lipschitz
gradients.
It remains to be seen, however, whether a generator-discriminator pair that
attains such an equilibrium produces samples that synthesise pr well. Could there be
a relation that holds between pr and pG when an equilibrium is reached? Recall, in
the case of the IMM-GAN, the minimax solution coincided with the two distributions
in fact being equal.
As an example of the latter, Unterthiner et al. (2017) introduces a new version of
the GAN problem which treats the data samples as charged particles on a potential
field. This GAN model possesses only one Nash equilibrium, which is optimal in
that we get pr = pG.
However, this approach suffers from the drawback that it requires the discrim-
inator to learn slow enough to accurately estimate the potential function induced
by the generator, and that the generator must in turn learn even more slowly.7
Moreover, the samples it produces for some standard datasets are not particularly
visually appealing (see Figure 4.1).
7Unterthiner et al. (2017, p. 7).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The literature on GANs is still in a very early stage, with the vast majority of papers
developing their theory having been published within the last 18 months. As we
have seen, there is still some way to go in understanding GAN training: what it
means for GANs to perform well, and what guarantees there are on whether a GAN
will perform well.
Nonetheless, both the topological and game-theoretic perspectives on GANs al-
low for us to propose versions of GANs that avoid the immediate pitfalls like mode
collapse. Moreover, they allow us to make use of the theoretical insights from these
areas: for instance, the Wasserstein GAN is inspired by previous research in optimal
transport.
There is still plenty of work to be done on GANs: the game-theoretic approach
seems particularly promising and under-explored. It seems, moreover, that any
progress made with training GANs using this approach would require tools in algo-
rithmic game theory that would have applications elsewhere in the field.
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Appendix A
Omitted Proofs from Chapter 3
Proof of Theorem 3.2.9, Part 1.
(⇒) Let µm be the mixture distribution µm = 12(µn + µ), so µm depends on n.
For any signed measure ν, define ‖ν‖TV := supA⊆X |ν(A)| for all Borel sets A.
Then
dTV (µm‖µn) = ‖µm − µn‖TV
=
1
2
‖µ− µn‖TV
=
1
2
dTV (µn‖µ) ≤ dTV (µn‖µ) .
Hence, dTV (µm‖µn) tends to 0 if dTV (µn‖µ) tends to 0.
Now let fn =
dµn
dµm
be the Radon-Nykodim derivative between µn and µm. By
construction, we have for every Borel set A that µn(A) ≤ 2µm(A). Picking
A = {fn > 3}, we get
µn(A) =
∫
A
fn dµm ≥ 3µm(A),
and so by these two inequalities, µm(A) = 0. Hence fn ≤ 3 almost everywhere,
with respect to the measures µm, µn, and µ.
Now fix ε > 0, and An = {fn > 1 + ε}. Then
µn(An) =
∫
An
fn dµm ≥ (1 + ε)µm(An).
Hence
εµm(An) ≤ µn(An)− µm(An)
≤ |µn(An)− µm(An)|
≤ dTV (µn‖µm)
≤ dTV (µn‖µ) .
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Furthermore,
µn(An) ≤ µm(An) + |µn(An)− µm(An)|
≤ 1
ε
dTV (µn‖µ) + dTV (µn‖µm)
≤
(
1
ε
+ 1
)
dTV (µn‖µ) .
Therefore,
dKL (µn‖µm) =
∫
X
log(fn) dµn
≤ log(1 + ε) +
∫
An
log(fn) dµn
≤ log(1 + ε) + log(3)µn(An)
≤ log(1 + ε) + log(3)
(
1
ε
+ 1
)
dTV (µn‖µ) .
By taking lim sup on both sides, we get that
0 ≤ lim sup dKL (µn‖µm) ≤ log(1 + ε)
for all ε > 0, and so dKL (µn‖µm)→ 0.
Likewise, we define gn =
dµ
dµm
and Bn = {gn > 1+ε}, showing mutatis mutandis
that dKL (µ‖µm)→ 0. From this, we conclude that
dJS (µn‖µ) = 1
2
(
dKL (µn‖µm) + dKL (µ‖µm)
)→ 0.
(⇐) Using the triangle and Pinsker’s inequalities, we get
dTV (µn‖µ) ≤ dTV (µn‖µm) + dTV (µ‖µm)
≤
√
1
2
dKL (µn‖µm) +
√
1
2
dKL (µ‖µm)
≤ 2
√
1
2
dJS (µn‖µ)→ 0.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.13. Define
V (f˜ , θ) := Ex∼pr [f˜(x)]− Ex∼gθ [f˜(x)]
= Ex∼pr [f˜(x)]− Ez∼pz [f˜(gθ(x))],
where f˜ ∈ F = Lip1(X ) and θ ∈ Rd.
Since X is compact, we know by the Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality (Theo-
rem 3.2.2) that there is an f ∈ F such that
dW (pr‖gθ) = sup
f˜∈F
V (f˜ , θ) = V (f, θ). (A.0.1)
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Now define X∗(θ) to be the set of f such that (A.0.1) holds. The duality tells us
that this set is non-empty. Moreover, by an envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal,
2002, Theorem 1) we have
∇θdW (pr‖gθ) = ∇θV (f, θ) (A.0.2)
for any f ∈ X∗(θ), when both terms are well-defined.
Now take an f ∈ X∗(θ). Then, when the first two terms are well-defined,
∇θdW (pr‖gθ) = ∇θV (f, θ)
= ∇θ[Ex∼pr [f(x)]− Ez∼pz [f(gθ(x))]]
= −∇θEz∼pz [f(gθ(x))].
The technical remainder of this proof is to show that
−∇θEz∼pz [f(gθ(x))] = −Ez∼pz [∇θf(gθ(x))]. (A.0.3)
Since f ∈ F , f is 1-Lipschitz. Moreover, f(gθ(z)) is locally Lipschitz on (θ, z)
with constants L(θ, z) given by the assumption on g. Hence, by Rademacher’s The-
orem (Federer, 2014, Theorem 3.1.6), f(gθ(z)) is differentiable almost everywhere
for (θ, z) jointly. In other words, the set A = {(θ, z) | f ◦ g is not differentiable} has
measure 0.
By Fubini’s Theorem, this implies that for almost every θ, the section Aθ = {z |
(θ, z) ∈ A} has measure 0. Fix some θ0 such that the measure of Aθ0 is null, and
the RHS of equation (A.0.3) is well-defined. For this θ0, we have that ∇θf(gθ(z))|θ0
is well-defined for almost any z, and pz-almost everywhere.
By our Lipschitz assumption, we know that
Ez∼pz [‖∇θf(gθ(z))|θ0‖] ≤ Ez∼pz [L(θ0, z)] < +∞, (A.0.4)
so Ez∼pz [∇θf(gθ(z))|θ0 ] is well-defined for almost every θ0. Therefore,
Ez∼pz [f(gθ(z))]− Ez∼pz [f(gθ0(z))]−
〈
(θ − θ0,Ez∼pz [∇θf(gθ(z))|θ0 ]
〉
‖θ − θ0‖
= Ez∼pz
[
f(gθ(z))− f(gθ0(z))−
〈
(θ − θ0,∇θf(gθ(z))|θ0
〉
‖θ − θ0‖
]
. (A.0.5)
By the differentiability of f ◦ g, the term inside the integral converges pz-almost
everywhere to 0 as θ → θ0. Moreover,∥∥∥∥f(gθ(z))− f(gθ0(z))−
〈
(θ − θ0,∇θf(gθ(z))|θ0
〉
‖θ − θ0‖
∥∥∥∥
≤ ‖θ − θ0‖L(θ0, z) + ‖θ − θ0‖ · ‖∇θf(gθ(z))|θ0‖‖θ − θ0‖
≤ 2L(θ0, z). (A.0.6)
Furthermore, since Ez∼pz [2L(θ0, z)] < +∞ by the Lipschitz assumption, by domi-
nated convergence equation A.0.5 tends to 0 as θ → θ0, so that
∇θEz∼pz [f(gθ(x))] = Ez∼pz [∇θf(gθ(x))] (A.0.7)
for almost every θ, and in particular when the RHS is well-defined. The LHS is also
proven to exist simultaneously.
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Appendix B
Omitted Proofs from Chapter 4
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2.7 (Glicksberg’s Theo-
rem)
This proof is as in Ozdaglar (2010, Lecture 6). We first give a generalised definition
of a continuous game.
Definition B.1.1. A continuous game is a game 〈I, (Si), (ui)〉 where I is a finite
set, the Si are non-empty compact metric spaces, and the ui : S → R are continuous
functions valued on S = ×i∈ISi.
Let u = (u1, ..., uI) and u˜ = (u˜1, ..., u˜I) be two profiles of utility functions (|I| =
I) defined on S such that, for each i ∈ I, the functions ui, u˜i are bounded and
measurable. We can define the distance between the utility function profiles u and
u˜ as
max
i∈I
sup
s∈S
|ui(s)− u˜i(s)|. (B.1.1)
Clearly, this distance is symmetric, obeys the triangle inequality, and is positive
definite. Let G = 〈I, (Si), (ui)〉 and G˜ = 〈I, (Si), (u˜i)〉 be two games, and let σ be an
equilibrium of G. We can show that, if u and u˜ are close with respect to the distance
given above, σ is an ε-equilibrium of G˜. Here, the definition of a ε-equilibrium for
G generalises the definition given for a two-player game (Definition 4.3.1).
Lemma B.1.2. Let G be a continuous game. Assume that σk → σ and εk → ε as
k →∞, where for each k, σk is an εk-equilibrium of G. Then σ is an ε-equilibrium
of G.
Proof. We have by definition
ui(si, σ
k
−i) ≤ ui(σk) + εk ∀i ∈ I, ∀si ∈ Si. (B.1.2)
Taking the limit as k →∞ in (B.1.2), and using the continuity of the utility functions
together with the convergence of the mixture distributions under the weak topology,
we obtain
ui(si, σ−i) ≤ ui(σ) + ε ∀i ∈ I, ∀si ∈ Si. (B.1.3)
Hence σ is an ε-equilibrium of G.
The next step is to define a notion of closeness of two strategic games, given the
distance of utility function.
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Definition B.1.3. Let G = 〈I, (Si), (ui)〉 and G′ = 〈I, (Si), (u′i)〉 be two strategic
games. We say that G′ is an α-approximation to G if for all i ∈ I and s ∈ S, we
have
|ui(s)− u′i(s)| ≤ α. (B.1.4)
Lemma B.1.4. If G′ is an α-approximation to G and σ is an ε-equilibrium of G′,
then σ is an (ε+ 2α)-equilibrium of G.
Proof. For all i ∈ I and si ∈ Si, we have
ui(si, σ−i)− ui(σ) =
(
ui(si, σ−i)− u′i(si, σ−i)
)
+
(
u′i(si, σ−i)− u′i(σ)
)
+
(
u′i(σ)− ui(σ)
)
≤ α + ε+ α = ε+ 2α.
The next proposition gives us the ‘discretisation’ necessary to approximate our
continuous game to an arbitrary degree of accuracy.
Lemma B.1.5. For any continuous game G and any α > 0, there exists an ‘essen-
tially finite’ game which is an α-approximation to G.
Proof. Since S is a compact metric space with metric d, the utility functions ui are
uniformly continuous. That is, for all α > 0, there exists some ε > 0 such that
whenever d(s, t) ≤ ε,
|ui(s)− ui(t)| ≤ α. (B.1.5)
Moreover, since Si is compact, it can be covered with finitely many open balls U
j
i ,
each with radius less than ε. We assume without loss of generality that these balls
are disjoint and non-empty.
Now pick some sji ∈ U ji for each i, j. Then we define our ‘essentially finite’ game
G′ with utility functions u′i to be given by
u′i(s) = ui(s
j
1, ..., s
j
I), ∀s ∈ U j = ×Ik=1U jk . (B.1.6)
This game is ‘essentially finite’, in that while the utility functions are valued on all
of S, they nonetheless attain only finitely many values.
Then, for all s ∈ S and all i ∈ I, we have by uniform continuity that
|u′i(s)− ui(s)| ≤ α, (B.1.7)
since d(s, sj) ≤ ε for all j. This gives us the desired result.
We can now prove Glicksberg’s Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.7. Let (αk) be a sequence such that αk → 0 as k → ∞. By
Lemma B.1.5, there exists for each αk an αk-approximation Gk of G.
Since eachGk is ‘essentially finite’ for each k, we can use Nash’s existence theorem
to guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium, equivalently a 0-approximate Nash
equilibrium. Denote this by σk. Then, by Lemma B.1.4, σk is a 2αk-equilibrium of
G.
Since S is compact, the space of mixed distributions ∆(S) is compact, so {σk}
has a convergent subsequence. Without loss of generality, assume that σk → σ.
Since 2αk → 0 and σk → σ as k → ∞, it follows by Lemma B.1.2 that σ is a
0-approximate equilibrium, hence a Nash equilibrium, of G.
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B.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3.4
We must first show that there is a finite mixture of generators and discriminators
that can approximate the equilibrium that exists for infinite mixtures.
Suppose φ is an Lφ-Lipschitz concave measuring function bounded in [−∆,∆].
Let U , V ⊆ Rp be the (compact) parameter spaces of the generator and discrimi-
nator, respectively. Suppose the generator and discriminators are L-Lipschitz with
respect to the parameters and L′-Lipschitz with respect to inputs. Suppose further
the value function F for the minimax game is given by the neural F -divergence1
with respect to φ:
F (u, v) = Ex∼pr [φ(Dv(x))] + Ez∼pz [φ(1−Dv(Gu(z))]. (B.2.1)
Furthermore, we suppose the generator can approximate any point mass: that is,
for all points x and any ε > 0, there is a generator such that Ez∼pz [‖G(z)−x‖] ≤ ε.
Note: all of the proofs within this section are as in Arora et al. (2017, Appendix
B).
Lemma B.2.1 (Arora et al. (2017), Theorem 4.2). In the above setting, there exists
a universal constant C > 0 such that for any ε > 0, there exists
T =
C∆2p log(LL′Lφp/ε)
ε2
generators Gu1 , ..., GuT such that, if Su is the uniform distribution on ui, and D
is a discriminator that outputs only 1/2, then (Su, D) is an ε-approximate Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. Let V be the value of the associated zero-sum game. One strategy of the
discriminator is to just output 1/2. Since this strategy has payoff 2φ(1/2) no matter
what the generator does, it follows that V ≥ 2φ(1/2).
By assumption, for any point x and any ε > 0, there is a generator Gx,ε such
that Ez∼pz [‖Gx,ε(z)− x‖] ≤ ε. For any ζ > 0, we can take a sample x ∼ pr, and use
the generator Gx,ζ . Let pζ be the distribution generated by this mixture of genera-
tors. By the point mass approximation property of the generators, dW (pr‖pζ) ≤ ζ.
Combining this with the fact that the discriminator is L′-Lipschitz and that φ is
Lφ-Lipschitz, it holds for any discriminator Dv that
|Ex∼pr [φ(1−D(x))]− Ex∼pζ [φ(1−D(x))]| ≤ O(LφL′ζ). (B.2.2)
Therefore,
max
v∈V
(
Ex∼pr [φ(D(x))] + Ex∼pζ [φ(1−D(x))]
)
≤ max
v∈V
(
Ex∼pr [φ(D(x)) + φ(1−D(x))]
)
+O(LφL
′ζ)
≤ 2φ(1/2) +O(LφL′ζ).
Here, the last step uses the assumption that φ is concave. Hence V ≤ 2φ(1/2) +
O(LφL
′ζ) for any ζ. Letting ζ → 0, we get that V = 2φ(1/2).
1Here, F = {Dv | v ∈ V}.
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Now let (S ′u,S ′v) be the pair of optimal mixed strategies as given by Glicksberg’s
Theorem (Theorem 4.2.7), and let V be the optimal value. We will show that, by
randomly sampling T generators from S ′u, we get the desired mixture with high
probability.
First, we construct ( ε
4LL′Lφ
)-nets for the discriminator parameter space V . Let
A be the set of centres for such nets. Since V is compact, A is finite. Moreover, by
a standard construction of such nets, we have that
log(|A|) ≤ C ′n log(LL′Lφ · p/ε)
for some constant C ′. Let u1, ..., uT be independent samples from S ′u. By the
Chernoff bound, for any net centre a ∈ A,
P
(
Ei∈[T ][F (ui, a)] ≥ Eu∈U [F (u, a)] + ε/2
)
≤ exp
(
− ε
2T
2∆2
)
. (B.2.3)
Therefore, when T =
C∆2p log(LL′Lφp/ε)
ε2
and the constant C is greater than 2C ′,
then with high probability this inequality is true for all a ∈ A. For any v ∈ V , let
a′ be the closest point in the net, so by construction ‖v − a′‖ ≤ ε
4LL′Lφ
. Using this,
one can derive straightforwardly that F (u, v) is (2LL′Lφ)-Lipschitz in both u and
v, so that
Ei∈[T ][F (ui, a′)] ≤ Ei∈[T ][F (ui, v)] + ε/2. (B.2.4)
We then get for any v′ ∈ V that
Ei∈[T ][F (ui, v′)] ≤ 2φ(1/2) + ε. (B.2.5)
Therefore, this mixture of generators can win against any discriminator, and by a
probabilistic argument, there must exist such generators. Since the discriminator
given by constant 1/2 can achieve the value V regardless of the generator value, we
get an approximate equilibrium.
Given the existence of the approximate equilibrium, the next step to prove the
existence of an approximate pure equilibrium is to construct a single generator that
can approximately generate the mixture distribution of generators. To do so, we
pass our noise input h ∼ pz through all the generators Gu1 , ..., GuT and implement a
‘multi-way selector’ to select a uniformly random output from Gui(h), where i ∈ [T ].
First, we show how to compute a step function using a two-layer neural network.
Lemma B.2.2 (Arora et al. (2017), Lemma 3). Let q be a positive integer and
z1 < ... < zq. For any 0 < δ < mini∈[q−1](zi+1 − zi), there is a two-layer neural
network with single input h ∈ R that outputs q + 1 numbers x1, ..., xq+1 such that
1.
∑q+1
i=1 xi = 1 for all h;
2. when h ∈ [zi−1 + δ/2, zi− δ/2], we have that xi = 1 and all the other xj are 0.
When h ≤ z1 − δ/2 only x1 is 1, and when h ≥ zq + δ/2 only xq+1 = 1.
Proof. Using a two-layer neural network with ReLU activation functions, we can
compute the function
fi(h) = max
{
h− zi − δ/2
δ
, 0
}
−max
{
h− zi + δ/2
δ
, 0
}
. (B.2.6)
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This function evaluates to 0 for all h < zi − δ/2, and 1 for all h ≥ zi + δ/2, and
changes linearly in-between. Writing
x1 = 1− f1(h)
xq+1 = fq(h)
xq = fi(h)− fi−1(h) ∀i ∈ {2, 3, ..., q},
we see that these functions satisfy (1)-(2).
Using these step functions, we can design the multi-way selector.
Lemma B.2.3 (Arora et al. (2017), Lemma 4). In the setting above, suppose the
generator and discriminator are both k-layer neural networks (where k ≥ 2), and
the last layer uses the ReLU activation function. Then there is a (k+1)-layer neural
network with O
(
∆2p2 log(LL′Lφ·p/ε)
ε2
)
parameters that can generate a distribution within
δ TV distance of the mixture of Gu1 , ..., GuT .
Proof Idea. Since we have implemented step functions from Lemma B.2.2, we can
pass the input through all the generators Gu1 , ..., GuT . At the last layer of each Gui ,
we add a large multiple of −(1 − xi), where xi is the i-th outputof the network
in Lemma B.2.2. Then, if xi = 0, this will effectively ‘de-activate’ the network by
bringing it below the threshold of the ReLU function. However, if xi = 1, this will
have no effect. By Lemma B.2.2, we know that most of the time only one of the xi’s
will be 1, so that only one generator is selected.
Proof. Suppose the input for the generator is (h0, h) ∼ N (0, 1)× pz, where samples
are drawn independently. We will pass the input h through the generators and get
outputs Gui(h), and then use h0 to select one of these outputs as the ‘true’ output.
Let z1, ..., zT−1 be real numbers that divide the probability density of a Gaussian
into T equal parts. Choose δ′ = δ/(100T ) in Lemma B.2.2 to get a 2-layer neural
net that computes step functions x1, ..., xT . Then the probability that (x1, ..., xT )
has more than one non-zero entry is smaller than δ. Now, for the output of Gui(h),
in each output ReLU gate, add a multiple of −(1− xi) that is larger than than the
maximum possible output. Therefore, when xi = 0, the result before the ReLU will
be negative and so the output will be ‘disabled’, and when xi = 1 the output will
be preserved. Call this modified network Gˆui . Then Gˆui = Gui when xi = 1 and
Gˆui = 0 when xi = 0. Now add a layer that outputs the sum of Gˆui .
By construction, when (x1, ..., xT ) has only one non-zero entry, the network cor-
rectly outputs the corresponding Gui(xi). The probability that this happens is at
least 1− δ, and so the TV distance with the mixture is bounded by δ.
Theorem B.2.4 (Theorem 4.3.4 restated). In the setting above, there exists (k+1)-
layer neural networks of generators G and discriminator D with O
(
∆2p2 log(LL′Lφ·p/ε)
ε2
)
parameters, such that there exists an ε-approximate pure equilibrium with value
2φ(1/2) to the game induced by dF ,φ(pr‖pG).
Proof. Let T be large enough so that there exists an ε/2-approximate mixed Nash
equilibrium. Let the new set of generators be constructed as in Lemma B.2.3,
with δ ≤ ε/(4∆) and Gu1 , ..., GuT as the original set of generators. Let D be the
discriminator that always outputs 1/2, and G be the ‘multi-way selector’ generator
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constructed by the T generators from the approximate mixed equilibrium. Let
F ∗(G,D) denote the value for the new two-player game.2 For any discriminator Dv,
we have
F ∗(G,Dv) ≤ Ei∈[T ][F (ui, v)] + |F ∗(G,D)− Ei∈[T ]F (ui, v)|
≤ V + ε/2 + 2∆ ε
4∆
≤ V + ε.
Here, the bound for the first term comes from Lemma B.2.1, and the fact that the
expectation is smaller than the maximum of expected values. The bound for the
second term comes from the fact that changing a δ amount of probability mass
can change the payoff F by at most 2∆δ (recalling that φ is bounded in [−∆,∆]).
Therefore, the generator will still fool all discriminators, and we therefore get the
required pure equilibrium.
2The game is new, since the space F of neural nets now includes neural nets of (k + 1) layers
instead of just k layers.
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